We design a new class of vertex and set cover games, where the price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs. This is in contrast to all previously studied covering games, where the price of anarchy grows linearly with the size of the game. Both the game design and the price of anarchy results are based on structural properties of the linear programming relaxations. For linear costs we also exhibit simple best response dynamics that converge to Nash equilibria in linear time.
Introduction
The standard measure of the efficiency in algorithmic game theory is the price of anarchy [17] , the maximal ratio between the social cost of a Nash equilibrium and that of the global optimal configuration. Intuitively, a low price of anarchy implies that upon converging to a Nash equilibrium, the quality of the acquired solution is close to optimal from a central optimization perspective.
Besides efficiency, algorithmic game theory stresses the importance of computational and information complexity issues. Each agent's payoff function should depend on few, local sources of data. Computing best responses for each agent should be straightforward. Finally, the computational complexity of computing equilibria, either in a centralized or decentralized manner, should be modest. For example, it is desirable if simple best response dynamics converge fast.
In this paper, we investigate fundamental optimization problems, vertex cover and set cover from a game theoretic perspective. We consider the vertices of a graph as selfish agents, and our aim is to motivate them towards choosing a near optimal cover while respecting computational and information theoretic constraints.
Games for vertex cover and for set cover problems have already been studied, however, all these approaches exhibit prohibitively high price of anarchy. Specifically, Cardinal and Hoefer [7] define a vertex cover game where the edges of a network are owned by k agents. An agent's goal is to have each of his edges supplied by a service point at least one of its endpoints. There is a cost c(v) ≥ 0 associated to building a service point at vertex v. The strategy of an agent is a vector consisting of offers to the vertices. Service points will be installed at vertices where the total offer exceeds the cost of the vertex. Similar games are defined by Buchbinder et al. [6] and by Escoffier et al. [9] for the more general set cover problem.
A different approach was followed by Balcan et al. [2] . Here the agents are the vertices of the graph, and their strategies are deciding whether they open a service point. If opening a service point, vertex v incurs a cost c (v) . If he decides not to open, he has to pay a penalty for all edges incident to v whose other endpoints are uncovered.
The price of anarchy is Θ(k) in [7] and Θ(n) in [2] . Indeed, if the underlying network is a star, and each edge is owned by a different agent in the first model, we get equilibria with all leaves being service points. These guarantees are significantly worse than the ones of the centralized setting, where simple 2-approximation algorithms exist [3] .
We close this gap completely by designing a distributed game with low information burden (i.e., the utilities of the agents depend on the state of their local neighborhood/subnetwork) and high efficiency (i.e., low price of anarchy).
Specifically, we propose a family of games for covering problems with the price of anarchy being equal to the best constant factor approximation algorithms for the central optimization problems. The following is an informal summary of Theorems 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. We say that a game on a graph has a local payoff function if the payoff of every player v depends only on the strategies of players within a constant distance from v.
Main result 1 There exist games with local payoff functions for vertex cover and hitting set that have pure Nash equilibria, and the price of anarchy is 2 for vertex cover and d for hitting set, where d is the maximum set cardinality. If we allow for nonlocal payoff functions these results can be extended to submodular hitting set.
Next, we give a brief informal description of our vertex cover game. In fact, we will incrementally construct our game from the perspective of a central planner who wishes to come up with a mechanism that incentivizes the implementation of near optimal solutions to these hard centralized problems with minimal interference.
We are given an undirected graph with the vertices being the players; every edge requires a certain service to be provided in at least one of its endpoints. Every vertex v has to decide whether it provides the service, incurring cost c (v) . If neither endpoint of an edge uv provides the service, both incur a high penalty as they fail to meet their joint obligation. If a vertex v decides to provide the service then it may ask contributions from its neighbors in exchange. Therefore in our game the strategy of v consists of two parts: it has to decide whether it provides the service, and if it does, its strategy also includes a compensation demand from the neighbors, a total of at most c (v) , which aims to cover (at least partially) v's participation costs. It may happen that two adjacent service providers demand compensations from each other. Service providers also have to pay the compensations demanded from them, however, we set an upper limit to the actual payment equal to its initial investment of c (v) . If the total demand from v exceeds c(v), it has to satisfy only parts of the demands, paying a total of c(v). This way, each service provider can always get protected against overpaying.
The protected status is the reason the bad Nash equilibria that are possible in [7] and [2] cannot occur in our model. As an example, consider a star with all vertices having cost 1. There cannot be a Nash equilibrium where all the leaves are providing service and the central vertex does not. Indeed, in this case, the demands to the center node for contributions would overwhelm it, and it would have a strong incentive to offer the service itself.
Our approach can be extended to the hitting set problem, which is equivalent to the set cover problem. We are given a hypergraph G = (V , E) and a cost function c : V → R + on the vertices. We aim to find a minimum cost subset M of V intersecting every hyperedge in E. This problem is known to be approximable within a factor of d, the maximum size of a hyperedge. In the corresponding game, the hyperedges represent sets of agents having a joint responsibility to provide a certain service. If a player decides to become a service provider, it is able to satisfy the demands of every set it is a member of. We shall prove that in our vertex cover and hitting set games the price of anarchy is 2 and d, respectively. Bar-Yehuda and Even gave a simple primaldual algorithm with this guarantee in [3] . No strictly better approximation factor has been given ever since. Furthermore, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture, Khot and Regev [15] proved that the hitting set problem cannot be approximated by any factor smaller than d. (Note that there exist also H |E| -factor approximations, that may be better if the number of hyperedges is low -the above proposition assumes no limit on the size of the hypergraph.)
It is a somewhat artificial feature of our model that service providers may ask for compensation from each other. However, this is unavoidable in a one shot game, where every player has to choose a strategy without referring to the choices made by the others. We chose to study a one shot game as the simplest possible approach. Note that the compensations may cancel out if the two providers ask each other for the same amount, and hence no actual money transaction happens between them. This will in fact happen in the Nash equilibria derived from approximate optimal solutions. Further, in the analysis of game dynamics, we will introduce a secondary term in the utility to encourage such a behavior.
As an even further extension, we investigate the submodular hitting set (or set cover) problem that has received significant attention recently. The goal is to find a hitting set M of a hypergraph minimizing K(M) for a submodular set function K on the ground set. Independently, Koufogiannakis and Young [16] and Iwata and Nagano [14] gave d-approximation algorithms. Our game approach extends even to this setting with the same price of anarchy d. This involves a new agent, whose strategy consists of setting a budget vector in the submodular base polyhedron of K. Otherwise, the game is essentially the same as the (linear) hitting set game. Note that the new agent plays a global role, although his actions are limited.
Terminology. In the description of our algorithms, we use the intuitive terminology of the Mafia. Both in the vertex cover and hitting set games, the vertices are the townsman who may decide to join the Mafia. Every edge in the vertex cover game needs to be provided "security", that is, at least one endpoint must become a mafioso, otherwise, he becomes a civilian. Similarly in the hitting set game, the hyperedges will be called clubs, whose "security" can be provided if at least one of its members joins the Mafia. If v becomes a mafioso, he may demand ransoms r(v, u) from his neighbours u in the vertex cover case, or r(v, S) from the clubs he is a member of in the hitting set case. In every club, all members have to contribute to the ransom at an equal rate.
If a mafioso v is demanded more than c(v) ransom in total, he becomes protected. In this case, he has to pay at most c(v) in total. In the vertex cover case, we prove a more general result, allowing any payment scheme of protected mafiosi satisfying certain weak assumptions. However in the hitting set, we are only able to obtain the results for a specific payment scheme, namely when a protected mafioso satisfies a proportionally decreased fraction of every demand.
Motivation and Applications. A motivation for the vertex cover game comes from a computer network, where the vertices represent individual computers or servers, each equipped with a certain communication device and controlled by a selfish agent. Each computer can be set either into client or into access point (AP) mode. The edges of the graph represent communication requests between the two endpoints. In order for two vertices to communicate, at least one endpoint must be in AP mode. Being in AP mode comes at a certain cost (energy and CPU time consumption); hence the access points may request compensation from their neighbors. However, if a computer is already in AP mode, it is a natural fairness requirement to bound the total compensation it should pay to its AP neighbors. The rules of the game lead to a dynamic process of potentially revising the decisions on being AP and the compensation demands; we let the process converge to equilibrium. As a different example, one may think of a highway network with the vertices representing cities, and every road needs a maintenance facility or a police station at one of the endpoints.
For the hitting set game, the motivating application is supernode selection, which arises in many applications in network protocols such as peer-to-peer networks, IP telephony, sensor networks, and file sharing networks. At a high level, supernode selection is the problem of picking a "nice" (e.g., well dispersed, cheap) subset of the nodes/peers V to serve a special role. Any realistic proposed solution must meet the additional challenge of operating within large, unknown, and dynamically changing networks.
Concretely, in the case of distributed file sharing, the nodes belong to (possibly multiple) local subnetworks S = {S 1 , . . . , S k }, S i ⊆ V . Inside each S i the data transfer is fast and cheap, however, the transfer between nodes in different subnetworks may be expensive. Each node has assigned a nonnegative c : V → R + measuring the cost of transferring data over the Internet (for a node with slow connection the cost will be high). Several protocols have been examined in practice. A common approach used for example by Skype [4] , is as follows. Instead of direct peer-to-peer connection, a group of nodes connected in a subnetwork S i selects a node s i ∈ S i to become the supernode. The supernodes then communicate directly across Internet forming a backbone of the communication network, and the traffic from ordinary nodes is relayed through them. Analogous protocols are employed by Gnutela, Kazaa [18] . A good supernode s should thus have low transmission costs c(s). The problem of supernode selection is then precisely the weighted hitting set problem on the set system S. Several such approaches usable in a real networking environment have been developed, (e.g. [19] and references therein).
Usually, these protocols do not respect the fact that a particular node s is privately owned and only the owner of s should decide whether its network connectivity should or should not be used to relay the service traffic. One way to address this issue is that the node connectivity may be lent for a certain price (paid either by money or, say, machine time) to other members of the subnetwork. Our proposed game, where nodes may decide whether they want to become supernodes and may ask for compensations from their neighbors, takes into account the competitive nature of the network environment. Our price of anarchy bound implies that this distributed and local protocol provides a set of supernodes with total cost providing a good approximation of the global optimal solution.
Convergence and Complexity of Dynamics
The above price of anarchy results imply that any Nash converging protocol will reach an almost optimal cover. However, there exist no a priori convergence speed guarantees for such protocols in general games. So, in order to complete the picture we need to argue about the convergence properties and speed of reasonable game dynamics such as that of best response.
Indeed, in our covering games, we first show that even in simple instances, round robin best response dynamics 1 may end in a loop. However, this can be simply fixed by a slight modification of the payoff. We introduce a tiebreaking rule for choosing among best responses that does not affect the price of anarchy results, but merely instigates the mafiosi to use more fair (symmetric) ransoms. Given this breaking of ties, we show that actually a single round of best response dynamics under a simple selection rule of the next agent results in a Nash equilibrium. This dynamics in fact simulates the Bar-Yehuda-Even algorithm. An analogous dynamics is shown in the case of hitting set. Moreover, these dynamics can be interpreted in a distributed manner, enabling several agents to change their strategies at the same time. The following is the summary of 6 and 7:
Main result 2 For the vertex cover and hitting set covering games, there is a best response sequence of O(n) moves that reaches a Nash equilibrium.
Related Work
The set cover games in [2, 6, 9] fall into the class of congestion games [20] . In the models of [6] and [9] , using the hitting set terminology, the agents are the hyperedges that choose a vertex to cover them, and the cost of the vertex is divided among them according to some rule. [6] investigates the influence of a central authority that can influence choices by taxes and subsidies in a best response dynamics; [9] studies different cost sharing rules of the vertices ("local taxes"). However, none of these methods achieve a constant price of anarchy. The model of [2] can achieve a good equilibrium by assuming a central authority that propagates information on an optimal solution to a fraction of the agents. In contrast to [6] and [2] , our model is defined locally without assuming a central authority.
Cardinal and Hoefer [8] define a general class of covering games including the vertex cover game [7] , and also the selfish network design game by Anshelevich et al. [1] . The game is based on a covering problem given by an integer linear program. Variables represent resources, and the agents correspond to certain sets of constraints they have to satisfy. An agent can offer money for resources needed to satisfy her constraints. From each variable, the number of units covered by the total offers of the agents will be purchased and can be used by all agents simultaneously to satisfy their constraints, regardless to their actual contributions to the resource. Further generalizations of this model were studied by Hoefer [13] , and by Harks and Peis [12] , investigating settings where the price of each resource may depend on the number of agents using it.
In the vertex cover or hitting set game, the resources are the service providers and the set of constraints belonging to the agents express that every (hyper)edge owned by them has to be covered. In the model of [1] , agent i wants to connect a set of terminals S i in a graph G = (V , E) with edge costs c. Hence the variables represent the edges of the graph and the constraints belonging to agent i enforce the connectivity of S i .
Our games can be seen as the "duals" of these coverings games. That is, the agents correspond to the variables, and are responsible for the satisfaction of the constraints containing them. If a constraint is left unsatisfied, the participating variables get punished. Also, a variable may require compensation (ransoms) from other variables participating in the same constraints. These compensations will correspond to a dual solution in a Nash equilibrium. We hope that our approach of studying dual covering games might be extended to a broader class of problems, with the price of anarchy matching the integrality gap.
Recent work of Roughgarden and coauthors [5, 21, 22] has shown that the majority of positive results in price of anarchy literature can be reduced to a specific common set of structural assumptions. In contrast, in our work we use a novel approach by exploring connections to the LP relaxations of the underlying centralized optimization problems. This connection raises interesting questions about the limits of its applicability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the Mafia games for vertex cover, hitting set, and submodular hitting set, and proves the existence of Nash equilibria and gives price of anarchy bounds. Section 3 shows that certain simple dynamics rapidly converge to Nash equilibrium for vertex cover and for hitting set. Section 4 discusses possible further research directions.
The Mafia Games and Price of Anarchy Bounds

Vertex Cover
Given a graph G = (V , E), let c : V → R + be a cost function on the vertices. In the vertex cover problem, the task is to find a minimum cost set M ⊆ V containing at least one endpoint of every edge in E. For a vertex v ∈ V , let N(v) = {u : uv ∈ E} denote the set of its neighbors. We will use the notation c(S) = v∈S c(v) for a subset S ⊆ V ; the same notation will be applied to other V → R + functions as well.
Game Definition
The Mafia Vertex Cover Game is a one shot game on the agent set V . It is described by a graph G = (V , E), a cost function c : V → R + , and a function r * S to be described later. The basic strategy of an agent is to decide being a civilian or a mafioso. The set of civilians shall be denoted by C, the set of mafiosi (Mafia) by M. For civilians no further decision has to be made, while for mafiosi, their strategy also contains a ransom vector. Each mafioso m ∈ M can demand ransoms from his neighbors totaling c(m). The ransom demanded from a neighbor u ∈ N(m) is r(m, u) ≥ 0, with u∈N(m) r(m, u) = c(m). The strategy profile S = (M, C, r) thus consists of the sets of mafiosi and civilians, and the ransom vectors. 2 We use the convention that r(u, v) = 0 whenever uv / ∈ E or u / ∈ M. Let us call c(v) the budget of an agent v ∈ V , and let T > v∈V c(v) be a huge constant. Let D(v) = m∈M r(m, v) be the demand asked from the agent v ∈ V .
Let us now define the payoffs for a given strategy profile S. For a civilian v ∈ C, let Pen(v) = T if v is incident to an uncovered edge, that is, C ∩ N(v) = ∅, and Pen(v) = 0 otherwise. The utility of v ∈ C is
Whereas a civilian v ∈ C has to pay the entire demand r(m, v) to every mafioso m ∈ M, mafiosi may have to pay only a part of the demands as follows. If v ∈ M and the total demand from v is D(v) > c(v) (i.e., v is asked too much), we call v protected and denote the set of protected mafiosi by
This is a function of the strategy profile S and is part of the game description. We allow an arbitrary function r * S satisfying the following three conditions:
Here (R2) is a weak condition requiring only that if v cannot satisfy all the demands then he will not fully satisfy either of the individual demands. As a natural example one can define r
be the total amount the mafioso v pays for ransom to the others and the total amount he receives from the ransoms. Then the utility of a mafioso v ∈ M is defined as
This means v has his initial cost c(v) for entering the Mafia, receives full payment from civilians and unprotected mafiosi, receives reduced payment from protected mafiosi, and pays the full demand to his neighboring mafiosi if v is unprotected, or reduced payment if v is protected.
The Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
Pure Nash equilibria are (deterministic) strategy outcomes such that no agent can improve her payoff by unilaterally changing her strategy. We will start by establishing that our game always exhibits such states. The following is the standard linear programming relaxation of vertex cover along with its dual. Here uv = vu refers to the undirected edge between u and v.
For a feasible dual solution y we say that the vertex v ∈ V is tight if uv∈E y(uv) = c(v). We call the pair (M, y) a complementary pair if M is a vertex cover, y is a feasible dual solution, and each v ∈ M is tight with respect to y.
Lemma 1 If (M, y) is a complementary pair, then M is a 2-approximate solution to the vertex cover problem.
Proof The primal objective is at most twice the dual objective, as
The inequality follows as each edge uv is counted at most twice. Note that tightness of the members of v is used in the first equality.
The existence of a complementary pair is provided by the algorithm of Bar-Yehuda and Even [3] . In each step of the algorithm we maintain a feasible dual solution, and M will be the set of tight vertices. It is straightforward that the algorithm returns a complementary pair (M, y), and therefore the algorithm guarantees an approximation factor 2. Our next lemma proves that a complementary pair provides a Nash equilibrium. Since the Bar-Yehuda-Even algorithm delivers a complementary pair, we have proved the following.
Theorem 1
The Mafia Vertex Cover Game always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
The Price of Anarchy
For a strategy profile S with α vertices incident to uncovered edges, the sum of the utilities is −c(M) − αT . Indeed, c(M) is the total cost for the members of M joining the Mafia, and there are α vertices that incur penalty T . All other terms in the utilities represent payments between vertices that cancel out when summing up all utilities.
By the social optimum we mean a strategy profile S maximizing the sum of utilities. This must correspond to a minimum cost vertex cover. To see this, first observe that in the social optimum, α = 0 due to the choice of T : even M = V gives a better total utility than any solution with α > 0. Hence the social optimum is −c(M) for some vertex cover M, that is, the social optima are precisely the minimum cost vertex covers. The Price of Anarchy is defined as the maximum ratio of the total utility in a Nash equilibrium and the total utility in a social optimum.
Consider a strategy profile S that encodes a Nash equilibrium. First, observe that Mafia M is a vertex cover. Indeed, if there were an uncovered edge uv ∈ E, both u and v would receive the high penalty T , and therefore they would have incentive to join Mafia. We shall prove that the cost c(M) is at most twice the cost of an optimal vertex cover, consequently, the Price of Anarchy is at most 2. Proof Let S = (M, C, r) be a strategy profile in a Nash equilibrium. Recall from Lemma 3 that M is a vertex cover. Using the convention r(u, v) = 0 if u ∈ C, let us define y(uv) = r(u, v) + r(v, u) for every edge uv ∈ E. We show that This verifies that the objective value for 1 2 y is the half of the cost of the primal feasible vertex cover M, proving that M is a 2-approximate vertex cover.
Set Cover and Hitting Set
In this section, we generalize our approach to the hitting set problem. Given a hypergraph G = (V , E) and a cost function c : V → R + , we want to find a minimum cost M ⊆ V intersecting every hyperedge. Let d = max{|S| : S ∈ E}.
In the set cover problem we have a ground set U and a collection of subsets S of U . For a cost function c : S → R + we want to find minimum cost collection of subsets whose union is U . This is equivalent to the hitting set problem, where the ground set is S, and to each u ∈ U , there is a corresponding hyperedge that is the collection of subsets containing u.
The hitting set game will be defined on a d-uniform hypergraph. The optimization problem can be reduced without loss of generality to d-uniform hypergraphs the following way: take an arbitrary instance G = (V , E), and let T > d v∈V c(v). Extend V by d − 1 new vertices of cost T , and for every S ∈ E, extend S by any d − |S| new elements. If there is a d-approximate solution to the modified instance, it cannot contain any of the new elements. Hence finding a d-approximate solution is equivalent in the original and in the modified instance. (However, note that this modification would have an impact on the game; we define that only for the d-uniform setting.)
Game Definition
We define the Mafia Hitting Set Game on a d-uniform hypergraph G = (V , E). The set of agents is V , with v ∈ V having a budget c(v).
We shall call the hyperedges clubs. For an agent v ∈ V , let N (v) ⊆ E denote the set of clubs containing v. The agents again choose from the strategy of being a civilian or being a mafioso, denoting their sets by C and M, respectively. The strategies of the mafioso m incorporates the ransoms r(m, S) for the clubs S containing m, with S∈N (m) 
r(m, S) = c(m). By convention, let r(m, S) = 0 whenever m /
∈ M or if m / ∈ S. We define the payoffs for the strategy profile S = (M, C, r) similarly to the vertex cover case. However, there is an important difference in the money paid by protected mafiosi: in the vertex cover case we allowed an arbitrary function r * S satisfying propeties (R1)-(R3). For hitting set, we were only able to prove the result for a concrete function r * that reduces all payments by protected mafiosi by the same ratio.
For a civilian v ∈ C, Pen(v) = T for a large constant T if v participates in a club containing no mafiosi, and 0 otherwise.
In each club S the ransom r(m, S) of a mafioso m ∈ S ∩ M has to be paid by all other members at equal rate, that is, everyone pays r(m,S) (d−1) to m. The demand from an agent is the total amount he has to pay in all clubs he is a member of, that is,
S∈N (v) m∈(M∩S)\{v} r(m, S).
The utility of a civilian v ∈ C is defined as U S (v) = −D(v) − Pen(v). A mafioso v receives the protected status if D(v) > c(v). The set of protected mafiosi is denoted by P , and they pay proportionally reduced ransoms. Let F − (v) = min{D(v), c(v)} be the total amount v pays. The income is defined by
F + (v) = S∈N (v) r(v, S) d − 1 ⎛ ⎝ |S \ (P ∪ {v})| + u∈(S∩P )\{v} c(u) D(u) ⎞ ⎠ .
The utility of a mafioso
v ∈ M is then U S (v) = −c(v) + F + (v) − F − (v).
The Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
The standard LP-relaxation extends the formulations (P-HS) and (D-HS). min v∈V c(v)x(v) (P-HS) max
S∈E y(S) (D-HS)
Again, for a feasible dual solution y, v ∈ V is called tight if the corresponding inequality in (D-HS) holds with equality. A pair (M, y) of a hitting set M and a feasible dual y is called a complementary pair if the dual inequality corresponding to any v ∈ M is tight. The following simple claim generalizes Lemma 1.
Lemma 5 If (M, y) is a complementary pair, then M is a d-approximate solution to the hitting set problem. Proof The primal objective is at most d-times the dual objective, as v∈M c(v) = v∈M S∈N (v) y(S) ≤ d S∈E y(S).
The inequality follows as each club is counted at most d times.
The algorithm of Bar-Yehuda and Even [3] outlined in Section 2.1 naturally extends to the hitting set problem, and delivers a complementary pair. Hence the following extension of Lemma 2 proves the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 6 Let us define strategies in the Mafia Hitting Set Game based on a complementary pair (M, y) as follows: Let agents in M be the Mafia and V \ M be the civilians. For each v ∈ M, define r(v, S) = y(S) for every S ∈ E containing v. Then the strategy profile S = (M, C, r) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof For each v ∈ V , D(v) ≤ 1 d − 1
S∈N (v) y(S)|(S ∩ M) \ {v}| ≤ c(v) and therefore there are no protected mafiosi. If v is a civilian, his payoff is −D(v).
He would not get a protected status if he entered the Mafia as D(v) ≤ c(v), and thus his payoff would be −c(v)+F + (v)−D(v) ≤ −D(v) by arbitrary choice of ransoms.
If v is a mafioso, he has F + (v) = c(v) as none of his neighbours is protected. Thus his utility is −D(v), the maximum he can obtain for any strategy.
As the algorithm of Bar-Yehuda and Even [3] provides a complementary pair, this immediately yields the following.
Theorem 3
The Mafia Hitting Set Game always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
The Price of Anarchy
Lemma 7 Let the strategy profile S = (M, C, r) be a Nash equilibrium. Then M is a hitting set and there are no protected mafiosi.
Proof The proof follows the same lines as for Lemma 3. It is straightforward that M is a hitting set. For a contradiction, assume P = ∅. First, we to show that there exists an unprotected m ∈ M \ P and S ∈ E, S ∩ P = ∅, such that r(m, S) > 0. To see this, assume for a contradiction that there exists no such m ∈ M \ P . The total demand from protected mafiosi is
r(t, S).
By the assumption, the latter sum can be nonzero only if t ∈ P , and hence the total sum is ≤
t∈P S∈E r(t, S) = c(P ),
a contradiction. For an m as above, if there exists no set S ∈ E with S ∩ M = {m}, then he could increase his utility by leaving the Mafia. On the other hand, if there exists such a set S , he could increase his utility by decreasing r(m, S) and increasing r(m, S ), as every member of S \ {m} is a civilian and pays the entire ransom demanded by m.
The following lemma is the analogue of Lemma 4, yet the proof is substantially different. In particular, the reason why we cannot extend our results to a more general set of payoff functions as in vertex cover is that we were unable to prove this Lemma under more general circumstances.
Lemma 8 Let the strategy profile S = (M, C, r) be a Nash equilibrium and let
v ∈ C. Then D(v) ≤ d d−1 c(v).
Proof Suppose the contrary, let there be a v ∈ C such that D(v) > d d−1 c(v). His current utility is U S (v) = −D(v).
We show that v could join Mafia and set ransoms that provide him a strictly larger utility. If 
We define the ransoms r (v, S) by "stealing" the strategies of the other mafiosi. That is, for each club S ∈ N (v),
is the total ransom v has to pay to the members of this club. We define r (v, S) proportionally to this amount:
Note that S∈N (v) r (v, S) = c(v)
follows by the definition. By Lemma 7, we know that there are no protected mafiosi in the Nash equilibrium S. We show that after v enters Mafia, even if some of the old mafiosi become protected, they are only slightly overcharged. More precisely, we shall show that
From this bound, (1) immediately follows. Indeed, everybody will pay at least
fraction of the demands, and therefore
It is left to prove (2) . The demand of v from some t ∈ M can be bounded as follows:
Here we used that D(t) ≤ c(t) as t was not protected in S.
Using this fact once more, we get
Theorem 4 The price of anarchy for the Mafia Hitting Set Game is d.
Proof Let S = (M, C, r) be a strategy profile in a Nash equilibrium. Then M is a hitting set, as if there was an uncovered club, all members would be unhappy due to the term Pen(v). We show that the cost of M is within a factor d from the optimum.
Let us set y(S) = v∈M∩S r(v, S) for each S ∈ E. Lemmas 7 and 8 easily imply
S∈E:v∈S y(S) ≤ d · c(v)
for every v ∈ V , and thus 1 d y is a feasible dual solution to (D-HS). Then
showing that M is a d-approximate solution to (P-HS).
Submodular Hitting Set
In the submodular hitting set problem, we are given a hypergraph G = (V , E) with a submodular set function K : 2 V → R + , that is, K(∅) = 0, and
We shall assume also that K is monotone, that is,
Our aim is to find a hitting set M minimizing K(M).
Koufogiannakis and Young [16] and Iwata and Nagano [14] obtained d-approximation algorithms for this problem, where d is the maximum size of a hyperedge. We shall present the primal-dual algorithm in [14] , a natural extension of the BarYehuda-Even algorithm.
For a vector z ∈ R V and a set Z ⊆ V we use the notation z(Z) = v∈Z z(v). For a submodular function K it is natural to define the following two polyhedra. The submodular polyhedron is
and the submodular base polyhedron is
We refer the reader to [23, Chapter 44] for further background on submodularity. Given a vector z ∈ P (K) the set Z is tight with respect to z if z(Z) = K(Z). An elementary consequence of submodularity is that for every z ∈ P (K), there exists a unique maximal tight set (see e.g. [23, Thm 44.2] ). Note that B(sK) ⊆ P (K) and z ∈ P (K) is in B(K) if and only if V is tight.
In the LP relaxation we assign a primal variable ξ(Z) to every subset Z ⊆ V . In an integer solution, ξ(Z) = 1 if Z is the chosen hitting set and 0 otherwise.
Note that in the dual program y uniquely defines z. Therefore we will say that y is a feasible dual solution if the corresponding z is in P (K). For the special case of the (linear) hitting set problem, where K(Z) = v∈Z c(z) for some c : V → R + , this is equivalent to y satisfying (D-HS).
Accordingly, we say that a set Z is tight for a feasible dual y if z(Z) = K(Z). For a hitting set M and a feasible dual solution y, we say that (M, y) is a complementary pair if M is tight for y. The following is the generalization of Lemmas 1 and 5.
Lemma 9 If (M, y) is a complementary pair, then M is a d-approximate solution of the submodular hitting set problem.
Proof The primal objective is at most d times the dual objective, as
The first equality is due to the tightness of M. The inequality follows as each S is counted |S| ≤ d times.
The algorithm by Iwata and Nagano [14] is as follows: In step (1-2) , χ S is the characteristic function of S. This step can be performed in the same running time as a submodular function minimization (see [10] ). Note also that M will always intersect S in step (1-4) and therefore will be strictly extended. It is immediate that it returns a complementary pair (M, y) and thus Lemma 9 proves d-approximation.
Game Definition
The vector z in (D-SHS) plays an analogous role to the budgets c in the (linear) Mafia Hitting Set Game. We introduce a new agent, the Godfather to set the budgets of the agents.
The Submodular Mafia Hitting Set Game is defined on a hypergraph G = (V , E) and a monotone submodular set function K : 2 V → R + . There are |V | + 1 agents, one for each vertex and a special agent g, called the Godfather.
The strategy of the Godfather is to return a budget vectorc ∈ B(K). The basic strategy of an agent v ∈ V is to decide being a civilian or being a mafioso. The strategy of a mafioso m further incorporates normalized ransoms r 0 (m, S) ≥ 0 for clubs S ∈ N (m) with S∈N (m) r 0 (m, S) = 1, that is, r 0 (m, S) expresses the fraction of the budget of m he is willing to charge on S.
The sets of civilians and mafiosi will again be denoted by C and M, respectively. Hence a strategy profile is given as S = (M, C,c, r 0 ) . The actual ransoms will be r(m, S) = r 0 (m, S) ·c(m).
The utility of the Godfather is the total budget of the Mafia:
The utility of the vertex agents is defined the same way as for the linear Mafia Hitting Set Game in Section 2.2, with replacing c(v) byc(v) everywhere.
For linear cost functions we have K(Z) = v∈Z c(z). Then the only vector in B(K) is c, hence the Godfather has only one strategy to choose. Therefore we obtain the same game as described in Section 2.2.
Existence of a Nash Equilibrium and Bounding the Price of Anarchy
As for vertex cover and hitting set, we show that a complementary solution (M, y) to (P-SHS) and (D-SHS) provides a solution in Nash equilibrium. Let z(u) =
S∈N (u) y(S).
Note that z ∈ P (K) and M is tight for z. Let us raise the z(v) values for v ∈ C arbitrarily in order to get a vector in the base polyhedron B(K). Letc denote such a vector resulting from z. 
Lemma 10 Let us define strategies in the Mafia
Theorem 5 The price of anarchy for the Submodular Mafia Hitting Set Game is d.
Proof Consider a strategy profile S = (M, C,c, r 0 ) in a Nash equilibrium, and let r(u, S) = r 0 (u, S) ·c(u) for all u ∈ M, S ∈ N (u). Then (M, C, r) is a Nash equilibrium in (linear) Mafia Hitting Set Game Game for the fixed cost functionc(u). Indeed, if any player had the incentive to change his strategy, the same improvement would be possible in the submodular game. Hence the entire argument of Section 2.2 is applicable. In particular, there are no protected mafiosi (Lemma 7) and that every civilian is demanded at most 
Convergence to Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we investigate the Mafia Games defined in the previous section and prove convergence under certain best response dynamics. We first show that already in the Mafia Vertex Cover Game, a round robin best response dynamics may run into a loop.
Motivated by this example, we modify the utilities by adding a secondary payoff that instigates the mafiosi to use symmetric ransoms: r(u, v) = r (v, u) . With this secondary objective, we show that a single round of best response dynamics under a simple selection rule results in a Nash equilibrium. This dynamics simulates the BarYehuda-Even algorithm. An analogous result is then proved for hitting set. Finally, we discuss possible extensions for the submodular case. Assume that whenever z can change his strategy to get a higher utility, he always chooses to demand his entire budget 2 from one of the civilians among v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 (this is always a best response).
We claim that this will always be possible as z always stays in the Mafia, and at most 3 vertices among v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 will be in the Mafia at the same time. Indeed, a civilian will enter only if being ransomed by z. If v i is in the Mafia then his only option is setting r(v i , z) = 1, and thus if z has at least 3 neighbors in the Mafia, he becomes protected and thus all his neighbors save the one he is actually ransoming will have an incentive to leave.
The dynamics never reaches a Nash equilibrium, as if z is ransoming a mafioso v i , he has incentive to change to ransoming a civilian as v i is protected. On the other hand, if z ransoms a civilian v i , v i has an incentive to join the Mafia to obtain the protected status.
If we could incentivize z to change his strategy less drastically and ransom the other agents by at most 1, we could rapidly reach a Nash equilibrium. To enforce such a behavior, we introduce a secondary utility function. Hence the induction hypothesis is maintained by an arbitrary best response of v. A mafioso who is not protected and has secondary objective 0 has no incentive to change his strategy. Also, a civilian v with c(v) ≥ D(v) has no incentive to join the Mafia if there are no uncovered edges incident to v. Consequently, the game ends after all uncovered edges are gone, and once an agent joins to Mafia, he would not change his strategy anymore.
Observe that the dynamics D V is closely related to the Bar-Yehuda-Even algorithm: if the next agent always ransoms only one of its civilian neighbors, then it corresponds to a possible run of the algorithm.
The above dynamics can be naturally interpreted in a distributed manner. In the proof of Theorem 6, we only use that the vertex v changing his strategy is a local minimizer of c(v) − D(v). The simultaneous move of two agents u and v could interfere only if uv ∈ E or they have a neighbor t in common. In this case, c(t) < D(t) could result if both u and v start ransoming t simultaneously.
We assume that the agents have a hierarchical ordering ≺: u ≺ v expresses that v is more powerful than u. We call an agent v a local minimizer if v ∈ C, v is incident to some uncovered edges, and
A local minimizer v is then called eligible if u ≺ v for all local minimizers u whose distance from v is at most 2.
We start from C = V . In each iteration of the dynamics, we let all eligible agents change their strategy to a best response simultaneously. As in the proof of Theorem 6, c(v) − D(v) ≥ 0 is maintained for all v ∈ V , and thus the dynamics terminates after each agent changes his strategy at most once.
Hitting Set
The natural generalization of the secondary objective for hitting set is as follows: For a club S ∈ E, let var(S) denote the maximum difference between ransoms on this edge. Similarly to the vertex cover case, the dynamics D H essentially simulates the BarYehuda-Even algorithm. Also, an analogous distributed interpretation can be given.
Submodular Hitting Set
One would expect that the Submodular Mafia Hitting Set Game also converges under some dynamics that simulates the primal-dual algorithm by Iwata and Nagano [14] . However, if the Godfather does not have a secondary utility, the following example shows that it can run into a loop even in very simple instances.
Let V = {a, b}, K({a}) = K({b}) = K({a, b}) = 1, and let g be the Godfather. Let E = {{a, b}}; for simplicity, we use the notation of vertex cover, e.g. r 0 (a, b) denotes r 0 (a, {a, b}). Let us start from the strategy profile C = V ,c(a) = 1,c(b) = 0, and play a round robin in the order a, b, g.
First, a enters Mafia and sets r 0 (a, b) = 1. Then b also enters to receive the protected status and sets r 0 (b, a) = 1. g has no incentive to move asc(M) = 1 is already maximal. In the next round, a is happier if he leaves Mafia; b has no incentive to change, however g modifies toc(a) = 0 andc(b) = 1. This will lead to a loop: a enters again in next round, b leaves,c is changed again, etc.
The above behavior can be avoided by introducing a secondary utility for g: let U S (g) = v∈M F + (v), that is, the sum of the actual incomes of the mafiosi. Note thatŨ S (g) ≤c(M) and equality holds if and only if there are no protected mafiosi. With this secondary utility, after both a and b enter Mafia, g will modify toc(a) = c(b) = 0.5, giving a Nash equilibrium.
We conjecture that with this secondary utility and the secondary utilities for the vertex agents as for hitting set, rapid convergence can be shown under an appropriate choice of the next agent.
Conclusions and Further Research
We have defined games whose Nash equilibria correspond to certain covering problems, with the price of anarchy matching the best constant factor approximations. The payoffs in these games are locally defined, and the analysis is based on the LP relaxations of the corresponding covering problems. An intriguing question is if similar mechanisms can be designed for further combinatorial optimization problems.
The first natural direction would be to extend our approach to a broader class of covering problems. The most general approximation result on covering problems is [16] , giving a d-approximation algorithm for minimizing a submodular function under monotone constraints, each constraint dependent on at most d variables. As a first step, one could study hitting set with the requirement that each hyperedge S must be covered by at least h(S) ≥ 1 elements; a simple primal-dual algorithm was given in [11] . However, extending our game even to this setting does not seem straightforward.
One could also try to formulate analogous settings for classical optimization problems such as facility location, Steiner-tree or knapsack. One inherent difficulty is that in our analysis, it seems to be crucial that any greedily chosen maximal feasible dual solution gives a good approximation. Also, we heavily rely on the fact that each constraint contains at most d variables.
In Section 3, we have shown that the best response dynamics rapidly converges for vertex cover and hitting set under certain assumptions. Stronger convergence results might hold: for example, we do not know if arbitrary round robin best response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium. For the Submodular Mafia Hitting Set Game, no convergence result is known. Also, a simpler game theoretic model that circumvents the need for a Godfather agent would be rather desirable.
